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Resumen: En este artículo, y con el objetivo de entender mejor los elementos fundamentales sobre los 
que se articula el derecho penal de los Estados Unidos de América, me propongo: 1) definir el actus reus 
y la mens rea; 2) trazar su genealogía histórica y su transformación, especialmente por lo que a la mens 
rea se refiere; 3) lo anterior se completa con un breve comentario de los principales casos legales que han 
ido conformando la mens rea tal y como se conoce actualmente. 
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Abstract: In this essay, and with the purpose of better understanding the fundamental elements on which 
the U.S. criminal law is based, I propose, mainly: 1) to define actus reus and mens rea; 2) to trace their 
genealogy and historical evolution, especially as far as men rea is concerned; 3) the above will be 
completed with a brief comment on legal cases that were once very important in relation to mens rea.  




The two essential elements of any crime, in addition to the necessary 
concurrence between them, as will be discussed below, are the so-called actus reus 
and mens rea. In this regard, a notable scholar like Eugene J. Chessney wrote in 1939 
through “The Concept of Mens Rea in Criminal Law,” that: 
 
The essence of criminal law has been said to lie in the maxim ‘actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.’ “ Bishop writes: ‘There can be no 
crime large or small, without an evil mind. It is therefore a principle of 
our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an 
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist.’” (627)  
 
Therefore, and with the purpose of better understanding these fundamental 
elements on which the criminal law is based, in this essay I propose, mainly: 1) to 
define actus reus and mens rea; 2) to trace their genealogy and historical evolution, 
especially as far as men rea is concerned; 3) the above will be completed with a brief 
comment on legal cases that were once very important in relation to mens rea. 
 
2. Definitions 
Given that it is the basis of the criminal system of the law of the United States 
of America, the articles that open the first part of the “General Provisions” of the 
Model Penal Code, published in 1962 by the American Law Institute and –
approximately adapted by the 70% of jurisdictions, despite the fact that none of them 
do so in their entirety–, deal with the above-mentioned actus reus (that is, the 
objective elements of a crime) and mens rea (the elements of guilt); we will here study 
then with greater detail. 
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2.1. Actus reus 
The importance of actus reus is paramount, since, for a person to be found 
guilty of a crime – understood as explained in Gilbert Law Summaries. Criminal Law, 
“an act or omission prohibited by law for the protection of the public, the violation of 
which is prosecuted by the state and punishable by fine, incarceration, and / or other 
restriction of liberty” (V)–, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that an 
incriminating act existed, given that the person judged deliberately participated in an 
act prohibited by law; participation levels may vary, such as, for example, the role of 
co-conspirator. 
The name actus reus comes from Latin etymology that combines actus (“act”) 
and reus (“guilty”), which eventually formed the compound concept composed of 
actus reus, in English “guilty act.” It is a concept that encompasses only a century of 
history and as such, since until the beginning of the XX century it had only been used 
within American jurisprudence, but not within its doctrinal system, so, as Joshua 
Dressler points out in Understanding Criminal Law, there is still no single widely 
accepted definition of the concept (85). In fact, this has led some authors, such as 
Douglas N. Husak in “Rethinking the Act Requirement,” to claim that, beyond the 
name per se, “the single matter on which [penal theorists] are virtually unanimous is 
that there is an act requirement in the criminal law.” Actus reus is thus understood as 
documented in Gilbert Law Summaries. Criminal Law as: “[a] n affirmative 
[voluntary] act, or occasionally an omission or failure to act, is necessary for the 
constitution of a crime. Mere thoughts are not enough” (VIII) (for example, writing in 
a personal journal, “I want to kill my co-worker, ” does not constitute, per se, any type 
of crime). These elements are composed of attendant circumstances, of a social harm 
and of a causation, which, in turn, can be a cause in fact (or actual cause), that is, 
“[t]hat particular cause which produces an event and without which the event would 
not have occurred” (Black’s Law Dictionary 201), or a proximate cause (or cause in 
law), but, which, in general terms, can be defined as: “[t]hat which, in a natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, 
and without which the result would not have occurred” (Black’s Law Dictionary 
1103). An example would be: James walked into a bank, pulled out a gun and shot the 
cashier, killing him. Here James would be charged with murder because he performed 
a voluntary act, “pull out a gun,” whose shot led to the death of the cashier 
(“proximate cause”). 
With regard to the act, Douglas Husak has referred to the need to reach a 
consensus about what an act is and what constitutes an act, as well as the realms of 
application. With this, and despite the disparity of opinions and legal interpretations in 
this regard, it has been generally established that in order for an act to be typified, a 
voluntary bodily or muscular movement is needed –that is, some degree of strength–. 
The above takes us to the point of the voluntary act, as it has been established 
in the Model Penal Code § 2.01 (1) and 2.01 (2); in spite of, again, the different 
interpretations in this regard and of the fact that, once again, jurisdictions vary, about 
what there is a certain unanimity is in the fact that the sense of “voluntary” indicates 
that, in effect, this voluntariness has resulted in a bodily or muscular movement that 
has been derived from the voluntary force that has been applied to it. In other words, a 
person who, for example, unfortunately suffers from Parkinson's, his muscle spasms, 
reflect a problem at the level of the nervous system motivated, among other reasons, 
by the death and neuronal degeneration of the people who suffer from it, and thus, this 
movement cannot be considered under any circumstances or precept as a voluntary 
act. Consequently, they lack any criminal responsibility that may derive directly from 
such bodily movements. 
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What is also important to point out here is that both the actus reus and the 
mens rea must concur –that is, occur at the same time– at the time of the act –or their 
omission–; yet this is still not enough, since the mental state must also coincide with 
the conduct of the actor or author of the crime. The idea behind what we call 
concurrence is that nobody should be convicted of a different or greater damage than 
that reflected in the mental state of the actor or author of the crime. However, 
jurisdictions vary in this regard as Wayne LaFabe explains in Principles of Criminal 
Law (8). The rule generally states that there are two types of concurrence required that 
have to do with the mens rea: 1) the one that exists between the mental state and the 
act; 2) the one between the mental state and the harmful result; the issue of failure or 
omission to act deserves separate consideration, but, in any case, an element of 
concurrence is still required in these cases. For example: a wife and her husband are 
sailing in the sea; the wife involuntarily pushes her husband, who falls into the water; 
the wife knows that he doesn't know anything, and even though she is an expert 
swimmer – a previous 400m freestyle Olympic champion— and it would be no risk to 
throw herself into the water to save her husband, she decides not to do so or call 
anyone for help, since, for a moment, she considers that she would be better off 
without him; as a consequence, her husband drowns, dying at that moment. As a 
consequence, she is guilty of murder, since, for even a brief moment, she had that dark 
desire to see her husband dead, thinking that she would be better off without him, 
since, and simultaneously, she did not offer her help to him, breaching the duty to act 
after she created the danger that ended-up causing his very death. This duty is 
understood here in the sense to which John H. Scheid in “Affirmative Duty to Act in 
Emergency Situations-The Return of the Good Samaritan” refers to when he states 
that: 
The duty [to aid] must be owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, 
otherwise there can be no negligence … and the duty must be owing the 
plaintiff in an individual capacity, and not merely as one of the general 
public. 
This excludes from actionable negligence all failures to observe the 
obligations imposed by charity, gratitude, generosity, and the kindred 
virtues. (2) 
 
In fact, in Jones v. United States, it is established that a person can be found 
guilty of murder if the duty of care to act existed: 
 
There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may 
constitute a breach of legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: 
first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where 
one stands in a certain status relationship to another; third, where one 
has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where 
one has voluntarily assumed the care of another, and so secluded the 
helpless person as to prevent others for rendering aid. 2 
 
The truth is that the treatment of the subject does not differ substantially from 
what was established by common law. 
In conclusion, in the hypothetical example mentioned above, what does not fit 
the slightest doubt is that she, the wife, is guilty of murder, understood as a “[t]the 
 
2 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3426. Qtd. 
Luis Guillermo Fernández Budajir, “Aproximación al concepto de Willfull blindness y su tratamiento en 
Criminal Law,” Diss. Universitat de Barcelona, 2018. p. 73. 
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unlawful killing of a human being by another with malice aforethought, either express 
or implied” (Black’s Law Dictionary 918). This last element (“Malice Aforethought”) 
is the necessary mens rea so that the elements that typify this crime are satisfied. 
There exists, therefore, when the defendant has a “guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful 
purpose; a criminal intent” (Black’s Law Dictionary 889). 
This leads us to the last element to consider for the actus reus, which is none 
other than that of social harm, derived from harmful conduct. In spite of, as was 
previously discussed, there are discrepancies in this regard, what cannot be ignored is 
that, in general terms, the social harm done has been considered as an essential 
element of every crime. However, there is authority and juridical opinions in this 
regard that disagree; in such cases, they consider and penalize behaviors that do not 
have to lead to social harm. And, as if this were not enough, a whole series of crimes 
that are characterized as being malum in se are also separated from this norm. Malum 
in se is the Latin expression for the English equivalent of “wrong in itself” which also 
deviate from this norm. In other words, something considered morally wrong, whether 
or not there is a legal principle that prohibits a particular behavior, and therefore the 
written law characterized it as a crime; basically, what happens is that this “wrong in 
itself” violates some aprioristic ethical and moral principles in which we live by as a 
society and culture (e.g. monkfish, murder, etc.). 
 
2.2. Mens rea 
In a general sense, and as noted earlier, the concept of mens sea–or “guilty 
state of mind,” is the other necessary requirement, along with the actus reus and the 
concurrence between the two, so that a criminal liability can be spoken of –Or 
responsability; I will not enter here, for obvious limitations of space and for escaping 
the objectives of this work, on issues that cover the scope of criminal liability, such as, 
for example, complicity in the crime, vicarious liability. 
An example of mens rea would be the following: 
 
John thought about the fastest way to commit a robbery of a bank and what 
gun he should use. Some days after giving some thought, he walked into this 
particular bank he had in mind and had studied, pulled out a very precise 9 
mm Parabellum gun, shot the cashier, and, as a result, he dies. 
 
Certainly, in the previous example a “guilty state of the mind” is noticed 
when, for example, it is stated that “after giving some thought,” thus mens rea is 
present. However, there is a possibility that for certain crimes there is no need for the 
existence of mens rea; I mean, of course, the strict liability crimes, understood as 
those that confer an inherent responsibility for the damages caused by the manufacture 
or use of equipment or materials that are dangerous per se (e.g. certain chemicals used 
for irrigation), together with the possession of dangerous animals, which excludes, for 
example, and as a rule, dogs and cats, although this does not include the general rule 
of “every dog gets one free bite.” In these cases it is not necessary that the owner of 
such non-domestic animals has performed any negligent conduct, since it is not a 
requirement to be charged with a crime related to strict liability crimes. 
The strict liability crimes lead us to the issue of intent, where one must 
distinguish between general intent vs. specific intent; while for strict liability crimes, 
as we have seen, the “intent” element is not necessary, it is necessary for crimes 
classified as “general intent” –when a person seeks to commit an act prohibited by 
law, being the performance of this act sufficient to charge the agent of the action–, 
“specific intent” –when a person intends to cause precise consequences with his 
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actions–, and those who simply require negligence or recklessness –or willful 
blindness–. It is true that, in this regard, and although under common law “ignorance 
of the law is no excuse” can be used as a general rule, it cannot be ignored that 
“ignorance is not a state of mind in the sense in which sanity and insanity are. When 
the mind is ignorant of a fact, its condition still remains sound; the power of thinking, 
or judging, or willing, is just as complete before communication of the fact that after 
… Culpable ignorance is that which results from a failure to exercise ordinary care to 
acquire knowledge, and knowledge which could be acquired by the exercise of 
ordinary care is by law imputed to the person and he is held to have constructive 
knowledge...” (Black’s Law Dictionary 672). Let’s look at it from a specific example: 
 
Jesse, a businessman parked his car and went into an office building to 
work. Around midday, a woman was seen forcing a door to get into the 
car, she removed items from the glove compartment and then left. The 
receptionist of the office building who saw the whole thing reported the 
incident to the police. When the woman was found, they realized she 
was a visiting relative of Jesse and had come to the car to get medicine 
she had forgotten. 
 
The “Defense of Mistake of Law,” can be considered when one refers to mens 
rea, especially when considering guilt; in the Model Penal Code, guilt that is 
determined by mens rea distinguishes between different degrees of reprehensibility 
when assessing a crime: purpose (same as intent), knowledge, recklessness and 
negligence and that came to simplify the long list of concepts that, for these four 
categories, existed within the common law and that, with the formulation of the Model 
Penal Code were simplified in the following ways as included in the Legal 
Information Institute: 
 
1) Acting purposely (this is the same as the intent) refers to the fact that 
“[t]he defendant had an underlying conscious object to act;” it is without a 
doubt the most important and in it is the foundation of mens rea, so that 
most crimes, given the breadth of the semantic field of intent, perhaps it is 
most appropriate to typify it as the criminal intent in order to reduce its 
complex semantics and link it directly to the mental state required to carry 
out a crime. In a more general sense, the intent includes other elements of 
guilt, such as the act of "acting knowingly." 
 
2) acting knowingly indicates that “[t]he defendant is practically certain that 
the conduct will cause a particular result;” for example, when a shooter, 
such as the one from 2017 in Las Vegas, in which 58 people died and 
another 422 were wounded, the shooter, Stephen Paddock, even if he had 
not intended to kill all these people – an intent which he did have, given 
his behavior and actions—the truth is that at the very moment in which he 
took the weapon and aimed at the multitude, he knew (he had the 
knowledge) that his shots would fall upon different human beings.  
 
3) acting recklessly is when “[t]he defendant consciously disregarded a 
substantial and unjustified risk;” such as, for example, when the actions of 
one person harm another, such as when someone drives recklessly and at a 




4)  unlike, from reckless disregard, acting negligently alludes to the fact that 
“[t] he defendant was not aware of the risk, but should have been aware of 
the risk.”  
 
 
The other possible defenses should be explained separately, such as the lack of 
mental capacity or acquittal in spite of proven mens rea, such as self-defense, but this 
escapes the objectives of this work, leaving it simply noted here without further 
discussion. 
 
2.2.1. Historical Background of the Mens Rea: from Common Law to Modal 
Penal Code 
Although as Eugene J. Chesney very well explained in the “Concept of Mens 
Rea in the Criminal Law,” “the origins of a concept such as that of mens rea must be 
sought both in Roman law (the main reference would be the speech of the great 
challenger and Roman speaker Marco Tulio Cicero, in his celebrated Pro Tulio –On 
behalf of Tullius–, 22,51) as, and mainly, in the canon law, especially with the 
changing notion of sin, given that one should take into account that its cultural 
construction has been changing over the centuries and with social development. 
Separate consideration should also be given to the influence of the Laws of Henry I as 
explained by John Henry Merryman in “La tradición jurídica romano-canónica” and 
Marta Morineau in “Una introducción al Common Law.” 
Within common law, understood as “[t]he body of law that developed over 
many years in England based on court decisions and custom, as comparted to written 
statutes (codifications of the law)” (Nolo’s Plain English Law Dictionary 78) –that is, 
judge-made law, mostly from before 1900– in which existed a clear division between 
actus reus and mens rea, especially as far as its denomination is concerned, the most 
remarkable thing is that of the twelve mental states that satisfied the elements to prove 
the mens rea, in the Model Penal Code they are reduced to four as explained by 
Herbert Wechsler in “On Culpability and Crime: The Treatment of Mens Rea in the 
Model Penal Code”: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence (24-41). In 
addition to this, another of the greatest achievements was that in the Model Penal 
Code the need to prove an evil mental state was eliminated, so it is now only 
necessary to prove the author's conscience at the time of committing the crime through 
the concurrence between actus reus and mens rea. Except for this, there are few other 
differences between the treatment of both elements of the crime between the common 
law and the Model Criminal Code. However, it is worth doing a brief historical review 
of the conceptualization of mens rea, as it has undergone the most changes. 
In this way we arrive at the end of the 19th century and early last century. 
Without going into more detail, and after almost a century of "American complacency 
in matters of mens rea," as explained by Gerhard O. W. Mueller himself in “On 
Common Law Mens Rea” only altered by the facts described above, there were two 
cases that marked a change in this regard; I mean Morissette v. United States3 and 
Lambert v. California4 (Mueller 1043).  
In Morissette v. United States “Morissette (D) discovered a number of spent 
military shell casings while deer hunting in an area marked ‘Danger-Keep Out-
Boming Range.’ Seeing them merely dumped in heaps, he thought they had been 
abandoned. He thereupon loaded three tons of them on a truck, took them to a farm 
 
3 Morissette v. United States - 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952). 
4 Lambert v. California , 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957). 
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where he flattened them with a tractor, and then finally took them to a nearby town 
where he sold them for scrap for $84. He was charged under a federal statute that 
makes knowing conversion of government property a crime. Previous decisions had 
pointed out the right of the government to regulate its property on a strict liability 
basis. As a result, when Morrissette (D) attempted to prove that he had no intent to 
convert the scrap unlawfully because he felt it had been abandoned, his offer was 
refused by the trial court stating, ´The question in intent is whether or not he intended 
to take the property.’ In other words, no mens rea scienter need be shown to establish 
felonious intent. His conviction was affirmed subsequently. He appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court.  
As a result, it was established that malum in se crimes must include the 
element of mens rea. Additionally, it is not possible to have a statutory strict liability 
version of such crimes. In other words, the Supreme Court established that there two 
elements must be present at the same time: an evil-meaning mind and its outward 
expression or action. This concurrence, set a precedent, in addition, for future 
decisions in different jurisdictions, which, from that moment on, the mens rea became 
an indispensable requirement for the perpetuation of a crime. 
In Lambert v. California, a convicted felon in California was defined by a city 
ordinance as a person who had committed a felonious act either in California or in any 
other state; if committed outside of California, the crime would have to be considered 
a felony in California. 
Another ordinance required any convicted person who stayed more than five 
days in Los Angeles or who had visited Los Angeles more than five times within a 30-
day period, to register with the Chief of Police; failure to register was a continuing 
offense, with each day’s failure to register treated as a separate offense. Lambert (D) 
was arrested on suspicion of another crime and was charged with violating the 
registration statute. The rule of law derived from the holding and decision was that 
only a defendant who was cognizant of a duty established by a statue and the 
consequences of failing to comply with it, could then be punished for the decision 
made. In other words, if a defendant was unaware of the law then the person could not 
be held accountable for its application.  
 
3. Conclusion 
To summarize, in the preceding pages I have addressed two fundamental 
elements of the criminal system of the United States of America: the actus reus and 
the mens rea; after offering its definitions, elements and genealogy within the legal 
system in which it is inserted, thus differentiating between the common law and the 
Model Penal Code. I have also referred to several cases that are considered absolutely 
indispensable when it comes to understanding how these concepts have changed over 
the years; yet, as noted, these changes have been more about their own denominations 
than about the contents of each element itself. Similarly, throughout the preceding 
pages, I have referred to the relationship between actus reus and mens rea with other 
legal aspects of the American system. The first and last purpose of these pages, 
however, was none other than to establish and deepen the knowledge of these two 
pillars of the criminal system of American law. It is for the future to make a 
comparative study of these elements with that of other countries that follow other legal 
traditions, which I think would be very interesting, and more at a time when the 
profile of the legal professional is changing rapidly, thus adapting to the global world 
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